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To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 86-728, Honig v. Doe 
This case raises important questions under the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 20 U.S.C. §1401 et seg. 
The resps, two emotionally disturbed children with aggressive 
tendencies, are handicapped within the meaning of the EAHCA. 
Resp Doe was suspended indefinitely after he assaulted another 
student and broke a school window. Resp Smith was suspended 
after he made sexual comments to several female students. The 
school districts moved to expel both students. 
Thev;C ordered that resps b;-readmitted, and~A9 affirmed. 
CA9 placed a five-day limit on suspensions of handicapped chil-
dren, and held that a school district may not remove a handi-
capped child from school for a significant period of time without 
completing an EAHCA proceeding, even if the child's handicapped-
related behavior endangers other children. CA9 relied on the so-
called "stay put" provision of the EAHCA, which provides that a 
handicapped child shall remain in his current educational place-
ment during the pendency of any EAHCA review proceeding, unless 
the school district and the parents agree to a change. 20 u.s.c. 
§1415 (e) (3). CA9 's interpretation of the "stay put" provision 
~--------------------~ -conflicts with holdings of CAS and CAll, which hold that school ----districts retain authority to protect the safety of other chil-







can order a change in placement while EAHCA proceedings are pend-
ing.) 
CA9 also held that the EAHCA forbids any "significant 
...__-~-
change of program or services" until a handicapped child's needs 
have been specially evaluated. CA9 relied on 34 C.F.R. §104.35, 
which requires that an "individualized educational program" CIEPJ 
be undertaken before making any change in a handicapped child's 
placement. In its cert. petn, the State argues that §104.35 ap-
plies to the Rehabilitatibn Act and not the EAHCA. It appears, 
however, that the State did not raise this argument below. In 
the lower cts, the State argued that not all changes in program 
or services amount to a "change in placement" covered by §104.35. 
Finally, CA9 held that the State is required to intervene 
if a local school district is failing to meet its obligations 
under the EAHCA. CA9 relied on 20 u.s.c. §1414(d), set out on p. 
8 of the pool memo. The State argues that §1414Cd) applies where 
a category of children are better served by attending a state 
school (such as a school for the deaf). Congress did not mean to 
require the State to intervene if the district is failing to 
serve an individual student. The statute creates various appeals 
mechanisms to redress the problems of individual students. 
I think the question whether dangerous handicapped chil-
dren can be removed from school before the completion of an EAHCA 
proceeding is an important one. The disagreement among the cir-
cuits warrants a grant. 
Questions 2 and 3 seem less important, there is no circuit 
split, and the State appears not to have raised its argument 
•:t"·· 
page 3. 
about the applicability of §104.35. I agree with CFR, in order 
to examine what was raised below. On balance, it may be better 
to decide all three questions, assuming they were raised below, 
in order to provide guidance in this area. 
I recommend a GRANT on Question 1, and grants on Questions 
3 if it appears from the record that the issues were raised } 
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ~~ 
January 9, 1987 Conference ( 5~~~ ~) 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 86-728 
Honig {Ca. Superintendent 
of Public Instruction) 
v. 
Doe et al. {handicapped 
children) 
v' 
Cert to CA9 {Sneed, Schroeder, 
Brunetti) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY. Petr seeks review of CA9's decision ruling {1) 
that a school district may not remove from school for a 
significant period of time a handicapped child whose handicap-
related behavior endangers himself or others until completion of 
-------------------an Education for All Handicapped Children Act proceeding; {2) 
that a child's needs must be specially evaluated under elaborate 
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procedures before any "significant change ,of program or services" 
is made; and (3) that where a local school district is not 
meeting its obligation to provide services to a particular 
handicapped child, the State must step in. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW. Resps Doe and Smith are 
emotionally disturbed children with aggressive tendencies in 
certain circumstances, and are accordingly handicapped within the 
meaning of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EAHCA), 20 u.s.c. §1401 et seq.l Pursuant to an individualized 
educational program (IEP), the San Francisco Unified School 
District placed Doe at the Louise Lombard School, a developmental 
center for the handicapped. On November 6, 1980, he assaulted 
another student and broke a school window. He was interviewed by 
the school principal and admitted his misconduct. The principal 
suspended him for five days and referred him to the student 
Placement Committee, which recommended his expulsion. Doe's 
mother received a letter notifying her of the Committee's 
recommendation and informing her that she had a right to a 
conference with the Committee on November 25. The Committee also 
continued Doe's suspension indefinitely under former Cal. Educ. 
Code §48903, substantially incorporated at current Cal. Educ. 
lThat statute provides: 
The term "handicapped children" means ••• 
seriously emotionally disturbed ••• children 
••• who by reason thereof require special 
education and related services. 20 u.s.c. 
§1401. 
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Code §48911, which allowed extension of suspension beyond five 
days pending resolution of expulsion proceedings. Doe's counsel 
objected to these procedures on the ground that they violated the 
EAHCA, asked that the expulsion hearing be canceled, and that an 
IEP team be convened. He also filed suit in d.ct. On November 
24, the day before the scheduled hearing, the San Francisco 
Unified School District canceled the expulsion proceeeding. On 
December 2, the d.ct. issued a ~~ ordering the school district 
to readmit Doe to the school. On December 10, it entered a 
temporary injunction against the school district barring it from 
excluding him while efforts were being made to find alternative 
placement for him pursuant to his IEP recommendation. Doe 
returned to the school on December 15. 
Smith's situation is similar. Pursuant to his IEP team 
recommendation, he had been placed in a special education program 
in a regular school setting at A.P. Giannini School. His IEP 
stated that this was "on a trial basis dependent upon [Smith's] 
ability to adapt to a regular school." Following a number of 
incidents of misbehavior on Smith's part, the school unilaterally 
reduced his program to a half-day schedule. Smith's grandparents 
were notified of this reduction and agreed to it, although they 
apparently were not apprised of their right to challenge it under 
the EAHCA. 
On November 14, 1980, Smith made sexual comments to several 
female students. He admitted to doing so to the school 
principal, who suspended him for five days and referred him to 
the Student Placement Committee for expulsion. The Committee 
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notified Smith's grandparents that it was recommending Smith's 
expulsion to the San Francisco School Board, that a conference 
was set for December 2, and that it was continuing his suspension 
pending resolution of the expulsion proceeding. Smith's counsel 
objected to the expulsion proceedings. The Committee canceled 
the hearing and offered to restore Smith to his half-day program 
or provide him horne tutoring. Smith's grandparents elected horne 
tutoring, which began December 10. An IEP team convened on 
January 6, 1981. Smith's counsel became aware of Doe's suit and 
sought the d.ct.'s leave to intervene. The court granted that 
request. 
Resps named as defendants the school district, the 
individual officials involved in the decisions regarding resps, 
and the State Superintendant of Public Instruction. As relevant 
to their claims here, they sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the district and its officials on account of its 
officials' direct actions against them, and against the State 
Superintendant of Public Instruction on the basis of his failure 
(1) to establish a policy regarding the discipline of handicapped 
students, (2) to monitor the district's compliance with the 
EAHCA, and (3) to intervene when the district deprived them of 
their rights under the EAHCA. 
V"' 
The district court granted injunctive and declaratory relief 
against the district on December 2, 1983, and against the State --Superintendant on April 23, 1984. It ruled first that because of 
its purpose of assuring handicapped children a meaningful public ~~. 
education, the EAHCA prohibits expulsion of handicapped children 
-----------
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for behavior that is a result of their hanGicap, and that 
California accordingly could not apply its statute regarding 
expulsion to handicapped children because it oio not make an 
exception to its grounds for expulsion for handicap-caused 
behavior. Second, it held that the EAHCA's "stay put" provision, 
20 u.s.c. §1415(e) (3), which provides that 
During the pendency of any [EAHCA review 
proceedings], unless the State or local educational 
agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the 
chilo shall remain in the then current educational 
placement of such chilo 
barred suspensions of handicapped children for more than five 
days, because a longer suspension would constitute a change in 
placement. Third, it ruled that before making any change in 
placement, a district was required by 34 C.F.R. §104.35, which 
states that 
A recipient that operates a public elementary or 
secondary education program shall conduct an [IEP] 
evaluation ••• of any person who, because of handicap, 
needs ••• special education or related service before 
taking any action with respect to the initial placement 
of the person in a regular or special education program 
ana any subsequent change in placement 
to convene an IEP team to evaluate the chilo's needs ana assure 
that the change was consistent with those needs. Finally, it 
ruled that 20 u.s.c. §1414(d) obligated the state to provide 
services directly to children whom the district was serving 
inadequately. The court enjoined all defendants against taking 
disciplinary measures against handicapped children except after 
following these procedures, and directed the State to provide 
- 6 -
services directly to any children whom a local educational agency 
was not serving appropriately. 
Both the district and the State appealed to the CA9. The 
appeals were apparently consolidated. Apparently nobody 
seriously contested the ruling regarding expulsions. With 
respect to the "stay put" provision, the district and State 
argued that the EAHCA should not be interpreted to bar schools 
from taking disciplinary steps necessary to protect the safety of 
both handicapped and non-handicapped children in the school, and 
that suspensions for longer than five days were such steps. As 
to the necessity of convening an IEP team before making any 
change in placement, according to the court of appeals they 
conceded the applicability of 34 C.F.R. §104.35, but argued that 
it did not cover all significant changes of program or services, 
since they did not amount to a change in placement. Finally, the 
State argued that 20 u.s.c. §1414 did not require it to intervene 
where a district was failing to serve an individual student, but 
only where it failed to provide a program for a class of 
students. 
The court of appeals affirmed except for the five day 
limitation on suspensions. While recognizing the practical 
difficulties created by such a holding, it ruled that an 
indefinite suspension pending completion of EAHCA proceedings was 
a "change in placement" within the meaning of the EAHCA, and 
accordingly forbidden by the "stay put" provision, although a 
thirty day suspension was permissible. It held that significant 
changes of program or services constituted a change in placement 
- I -
in 34 C.F.R. §104.35 and hence required an , IEP team evaluation. 
And it ruled that §1414 required the State to intervene directly 
in cases where the local agency was not serving an individual 
student. 
3. CONTENTIONS. Only the State is seeking cert from this 
decision, but it is seeking it with regard to all three 
rulings.It contends as follows: 
The CA9's ruling on the "stay put" provision creates a 
conflict in the circuits. CAl, 5, and 11 have recognized that 
§1415(e) (3) does not eliminate schools' authority to protect 
other schoolchildren and the handicapped child himself through 
suspensions. In Doe v. Brookline School Committee, 722 F.2d 910 
(1983), CAl recognized that the provision was directory, not 
mandatory. In Jackson v. Franklin Co. Sch. Bd., 765 F.2d 535 
(1985), CAS upheld the suspension of a learning disabled 
seventeen year old who had unbuttoned another student's blouse 
and touched her breasts despite the pendency of EAHCA proceedings 
on the ground that there is an exception to the stay put 
requirement where the child is a danger to himself or others. 
And in Victoria L v. Dist. Sch. Bd., 741 F.2d 369 (1984), CAll 
approved the suspension of a handicapped student who brought a 
razor blade and martial arts weapon to school and threatened to 
kill or injure another student while the student's EAHCA 
proceedings were pending, because "Congress had no intent to 
deprive local school boards of their traditional authority to 
insure a safe school environment." In addition the CA9's ruling 
is erroneous. Surely schools must be able to protect children 
t .,. ~·. 
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during the pendency of EAHCA proceedings. Hence §1415(e) (3) 's 
use of "shall" should be interpreted as directory rather than 
mandatory. 
There is no split on the other issues, but if left 
unreviewed the CA9's decision is likely to form the baseline for 
decisions in this area in the future. The court erred in its 
ruling that 34 C.F.R. §104.35 requires an IEP team evaluation 
before any change in placement of handicapped children, because 
§104.35 does not implement the EAHCA, but the Rehabilitation Act, 
to which the school district is not subject. See §104.1 ("The 
purpose of this part is to effectuate section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 •••• ") Finally, CA9's interpretation 
of §1414(d) (3) "amounts to legislating by the court." Petn at 
13. Section 1414(d) provides: 
Whenever a State educational agency determines 
that a local educational agency --
(1) is unable or unwilling to establish and 
maintain programs of free appropriate public education 
which meet the requirements established in subsection 
(a) of this section; 
(2) is unable or unwilling to be consolidated with 
other local educational agencies in order to establish 
and maintain such programs; or 
(3) has one or more handicapped children who can 
best be served by a regional or State center designed 
to meet the needs of such children; 
the State educational agency shall use the 
payments which would have been available to such local 
educational agency to provide special education and 
related services directly to handicapped children 
residing in the area served by such local educational 
agency. The State educational agency may provide such 
education and services in such manner, and at such 
locations (including regional or State centers) as it 
considers appropriate, except that the manner in which 
. . 
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such education and services are provided shall be 
consistent with the requirements of this subchapter. 
Petr argues that §1414(d) (3) is intended to address the 
situation where the best way of serving a category of children's 
needs is by having them attend something like a State School for 
the Deaf, not to substitute the State for the district when the 
individual child is not being well served. That problem is to be 
remedied through the various appeal mechanisms created by other 
provisions of the statute. 
4. DISCUSSION. CA9 is clearly in conflict with CAS and 
CAll with respect to the stay put provision. It is not squarely 
in conflict with CAl, because in the case petr cites, the 
question was whether a district court could order a change in 
placement during pendency of EAHCA proceedings. CAl ruled that 
it could do so in extraordinary circumstances. In fact CA9 
suggested that judicial relief would be available to a school 
placed in an impossible situation, and hence seems to agree with 
CAl. 
Moreover, interpretation of the stay put provision in this 
situation presents an important question of federal law, and of 
federal/state authority in the school context. Although, as CA9 
recognizes, its reading of the statute is unpalatable, it may 
well be correct. CAS and 11, and petr, do not offer a plausible 
basis in its language to find an exception to 141S(e) (3) 's 
seemingly absolute requirement. In any event, the question is 
potentially deserving of review. 
... v 
The other two questions are probably ~ot independently 
worthy of review, but CA9's decision on them seems sufficiently 
questionable that they may be worth entertaining if the Court 
takes the "stay put" issue. Petr may have waived its argument 
that 34 C.F.R. §104.35 does not apply to EAHCA recipients, since 
it apparently conceded before the CA9 that the regulation applied 
but argued that no change of placement had occurred. Before 
taking that issue the Court might want to call for the record to 
make sure it is preserved. On the third issue, when the State 
must substitute for the local education association, petr's 
argument seems quite persuasive. 
5. RECOMMENDATION. Call for a response and call for the 
record with a view toward granting issues 1 and 3, and possibly 
2. 
There is no response. 
~ 
December 8, 1986 Liberman opn in petn 
January 9, 1987 






PL EMENT~ ,~MORANDUM 
Con e e~ 
1. SUMMARY. Resps have filed an opposition to cert. whose 
- ---~---~ 
contentions are summarized below. 
2. CONTENTIONS. Resps contend that petrs did not raise and 
CA9 did not decide the first question they present for review, 
whether the "stay put" provision has an exception for children 
endangering themselves or others. They also argue that there is 
no split between CAl and CA9 on this question, for the reasons I 
- 3 -
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gave in my original memo. Additionally, they state that the CAS 
and 11 cases are distinguishable. The CAS case, they argue, 
involved not only a suspension but a decision by the juvenile 
court to commit the handicapped plaintiff to a state hospital for 
evaluation. The plaintiff then sought readmission to his prior 
public school placement. Hence in that case the change in 
placement had been made not by the school district but by the 
juvenile court. In addition, when the district conducted its 
IEP, it offered the plaintiff a series of alternatives. As for 
the CA 11 case, it did not involve an expulsion, but a transfer 
to an Alternative Learning Center on which a due process hearing 
had been held. Finally, resps argue that petrs' view of the 
"stay put" provision would gut the EAHCA. 
Regarding petrs' second contention, that an IEP team need 
not be convened before making changes in placement, resps argue 
that this does not raise a significant question of federal law. 
Below, petrs agreed that an IEP team did need to be convened, but 
disagreed about what kinds of changes in a program rose to the 
level of a change in placement. That is a factbound 
determination. 
Regarding petrs' last contention, that the State must step 
in to provide appropriate education to particular children where 
the local educational agency has failed to do so, resps cite 
legislative history to the effect that the State was intended to 
have the ultimate responsibility for assuring that services are 
provided, and contend that the d.ct.'s order was a proper 
exercise of its powers of equity. 
- 3 -
3. DISCUSSION. I think the Court still needs the record, 
including the briefs on appeal, to check what is preserved. 
Contrary to resps' contention, the CA9 did decide the first 
question petrs raise, and ruled that school districts could not 
suspend dangerous handicapped children. It is possible that 
petrs did not argue that they could, but that seems improbable to 
me. The distinctions resps note between this case and the CAS 
and CAll cases do not persuade me that the split is contrived. 
CAS did not rely on the intervention of the juvenile court in its 
ruling. Nor do I see how the fact that the district offered 
alternative placements there would matter under the CA9's view, 
since the CA9's position is that placement may not be changed at 
all over the objection of the parents until completion of EAHCA 
proceedings. The distinction of the CAll case is even thinner: 
petrs do not seek to defend their right to expel handicapped 
children, but only their right to suspend them pending completion 
of EAHCA proceedings. Hence the fact that this case initially 
involved expulsions (which the District backed down on in any 
event) is irrelevant. In addition the parents could have had a 
due process hearing, but turned one down, because their entire 
claim was that they were entitled to more than the due process 
required, i.e. EAHCA proceedings. 
Resps do not argue directly that petrs did not raise below 
their second contention, the inapplicability of the regulation 
requiring convening of an IEP team. Their brief reinforced my 
instinct that they did not, however, because it does not address 
that argument at all, but instead addresses the argument petrs 
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apparently did make below regarding the meaning of "change in 
placement." 
Resps' argument regarding petrs' third contention, that 
1414{d) (3) requires the State to provide services directly, is 
addressed to the merits of that contention, not to its cert-
worthiness. Regarding that provision, I wonder if there is a 
private cause of action to enforce any portion of 1414{d). I 
think its enforcement may be the exclusive responsibility of the 
Secretary of Education. The views of the S-G on that question 
might be helpful. Hence if the Court grants cert. it might want 
to consider inviting the S-G to file a brief. J~ 
4. RECOMMENDATION. Call for the record with a view toward f ( 
granting questions 1 and 3, and possibly 2. 
December 11, 1986 Liberman 
February 20, 1987 
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1. SUMMARY. The briefs on appeal before CA9 indicate that 
issues (1) and (3) were preserved, and that issue (2) was not. 
2. DISCUSSION. Before CA9, at pp. 21-23 of its initial 
brief, California objected to the d.ct.'s order barring any 
suspensions exceeding five days on the ground that schools have 
to be able to exclude dangerous children. It also objected to 
that feature of the order on pp. 6-7 . of its reply brief and cited 
- 2 -
S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 n.9 (1981), the footnote on 
which CAS relied for its holding in Jackson that schools retained 
that authority. That is enough in my view to preserve issue 1. 
Pp. 17-20 of California's initial brief address issue 3 and 
argue that the S1414 only applies to the limited circumstances 
outlined in its brief before this Court. California does not 
argue, here or there, that S1414 is not privately enforceable, 
either directly or under S1983. 
On p. 16 of its initial brief, California discusses the 
regulation that formed the basis of CA9's ruling on issue 2, but 
does not argue its inapplicability to EAHCA matters. Rather it 
argues that it only applies to changes in placement, not changes 
in programs. 
3. RECOMMENDATION. Grant on issue 1, deny on issue 2, deny 
on issue 3 (because S1414 is probably not privately enforceable, 
in which case the question of its scope would best be determined 
in an enforcement action brought by the Secretary of Education 
after an administrative interpretation). 
February 6, 1987 Liberman 
